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THE NEW FRONTIER OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
t
ACTIVE DIVESTITURE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

E. Andrew Longtt
A historically informed perspective reveals that the
Supreme Court redefined tribal sovereignty over the last quarter
century, despite its efforts to create the appearance of precedential
consistency. While the changes have come piece by piece, the
overall concept of tribal sovereignty currently guiding the Court is
fundamentally different than the concept which dominated federal
Indian law for most of United States history. One does not need
much historical background to recognize the most striking aspect
of this change. It does not come as a shift in congressional policy,
but as an active assimilationist thrust from the Supreme Court
bench. Prior to 1978, the federal courts offered a check on state
incursions into the sphere of a tribe's sovereign power, even as
Congress frequently diminished that power. In 1978, however, the
Supreme Court began a steady assault on the authority of tribes to
govern their reservations. This article aims to demonstrate this
change and explore some of the probable reasons underlying it.
At first glance, the recent sovereignty cases do not appear
guided by any discernable paradigm. The reasoning of the cases is
often confusing whether read independently or in conjunction with
earlier cases. With more study, patterns do emerge, and it is
possible to characterize the decisions as following a liberal,
consent-based view of tribal power. However well this may
explain the cases, it is far from clear that the Court intentionally
crafted the cases according to this paradigm. In fact, the Court
does not generally acknowledge that legal principles of sovereignty
have undergone any significant transformation. At least
superficially, the Court's majority opinions maintain that the
sovereignty cases form a coherent body of law with no radical
t An earlier draft of this article was awarded Third Prize in the 2003 State Bar of
New Mexico Indian Law Section Student Writing Competition.
tt Candidate for LL.M. in General Legal Studies, New York University, 2005;
J.D., Willamette University, 2003; B.A., Canisius College, 1999.
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transformations wrought by the cases discussed in this article. For
that reason, one must wonder if the change grows from reflexive,
ad hoc responses by the Court rather than from an intentionally
designed intellectual paradigm.
Many of the questions raised by tribal sovereignty are very
difficult to reconcile with the notions of the individual rights of
U.S. citizens and with principles of democratic majority-rule.
The questions of tribal sovereignty are distinct from any other area
of law in at least one very important respect: they involve a semiindependent people creating and enforcing law that may be
independent of and significantly different from federal and state
laws. From this perspective, one may conclude that the Court did
not set out to construct an over-arching paradigm of tribal
sovereignty. Instead, it ruled in favor of individual citizens' rights
and democratic majoritarianism whenever these principles were
potentially threatened by tribal sovereign power.
In the cases examined here, the Court places much value on
the complaints of individuals that tribal law may not grant them
due process because of its foreignness and the inability of
nonmembers to participate in tribal government. At the same time,
the Court gives virtually no weight to tribal concerns that absence
of a certain power will damage their ability to govern on the
reservation. Thus, while the Court continually reaffirms the selfgoverning power of tribes, it nonetheless finds the concerns of
nonmembers who might be affected by such power, to be more
compelling. This is something between a reflexive response and a
carefully crafted paradigm. It is an analysis that skirts the most
difficult questions through a lack of respect for the unique history
of Indian peoples. The Court does not generally struggle with the
most difficult aspects of the case before it, as dissenting and
concurring Justices have occasionally noted. Instead, it reads all
treaties, statutes, and precedent with an emphasis on protection of
U.S. citizens from tribal authority and a conclusory dismissal of
the needs of tribal government.
As tribes have become more prosperous and successful, in
part due to congressional self-determination policies, difficult
questions regarding the meaning of tribal sovereignty require
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attention. The Court's recent response, the sovereignty cases
addressed below, form an active assimilationist thrust to strip tribes
of the authority to govern their territory at the same time that
Congress has firmly rejected such assimilationist policies. The
history of United States-Indian relations contains episodes much
uglier than the principles emerging from recent Supreme Court
cases, but those episodes were not generated in the Court. While
the Court has often turned away from injustice done to Indians,
never before has it actively circumscribed tribal power in the
relentless manner which it currently endorses.
Part I of this paper explores the origins and nature of
federal Indian law's foundation principles regarding tribal
sovereignty. Throughout the history of federal Indian law, three
cases authored by Justice Marshall in the 1830s served as a legal
foundation for tribal sovereignty. The wisdom of non-Indian
scholars teaches that Marshall's principles established the federal
courts as protectors of Indian interests and upholders of the federal
government's trust relationship with the tribes. These foundation
cases, combined with subsequent nineteenth century case law, also
established the absolute plenary power of Congress over Indians.
Until very recently, Congress alone possessed legally recognized
power to divest the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Part I also
documents the Supreme Court's initial use of status, rather than
territory, to define the limits of tribal sovereignty.
Part II of this paper examines the Supreme Court's radical
transformation of the law of tribal sovereignty beginning in 1978.
The sovereignty cases of the last quarter century march relentlessly
toward complete divesture of tribal sovereign powers that affect
non-members. This represents a radical change, but not because of
some supposed previous beneficence of United States Indian law
and policy. Rather, it is a change because the Supreme Court
moved from its role as a referee holding the states and federal
government to the letter of congressional statements, to a role as an
active agent of compelled assimilation. In these cases, the Court
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emphasized traditional mainstream American values, particularly
individual rights, with near total indifference to the tribal interests.
There is little serious analysis of what is required to protect tribal
sovereign power and even less attention to the cultural preservation
of Indian peoples.
Part III of this paper synthesizes these cases in an attempt
to identify the forces underlying the Court's approach. In this
regard, examination of the consent paradigm as an explanation for
the Court's decisions is helpful, but incomplete. Rather, the Court
appears driven by an unspoken assumption that tribal sovereignty
is incompatible with the current United States political and legal
system. Whether this assumption grows in part from subconscious
racial prejudices, legal and political considerations, or both, cannot
be discerned because the Court offers no explanation for its
actions. Regardless of the motive, the Court's revision of Indian
law forces the tribes, particularly the weaker tribes, to bring
themselves into accord with Euro-American mainstream values
through either relinquishment of power or a series of compromises
that protect some aspects of sovereignty while sacrificing others.
I.

HISTORICAL CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY

A.

Roots of Tribal Sovereignty

The sovereignty of Indian tribes pre-dates the United
States. Any discussion of Indian sovereignty in the United States
ought to at least acknowledge that the practical and legal bases for
tribal sovereignty are as firmly rooted in history as the principles
upon which the United States was founded.' This paper will
examine John Marshall's opinions, which are often viewed as the
1 See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The People of the States Where They Are
Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies ":

The Indian Side of the Story of

Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 981, 988-91 (1996) (discussing
the recognition of tribal sovereignty in seventeenth and eighteenth century
treaties); John Fredricks III, America's FirstNations: The Origins, History and
Future of American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 352-60 (1999)
(discussing sovereignty in the eighteenth century and its importance for today).
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foundation of federal Indian law, but recognizes that the doctrine
of those cases may be an artificial and insufficient source for
Indian sovereignty. Indian tribes are not sovereign exclusively
because John Marshall classified them as such. The relationship
between the federal government and the tribes found recognition,
not its origin, in John Marshall's opinions. The following question
posed by a Native American law professor exposes the fiction of
an effort to ground the protection of Indian sovereignty in United
States Supreme Court opinions from the 1830s and a beneficent
vision of federal Indian law:
Given its history, how does this system of colonizing
law so potently imposed on the Indian by the United
States-this White Man's Indian Law-manage to
transcend the genocidal and ethnocidal threat it has
historically posed to the perpetuation of Indian
cultural 2identity, existence, and sovereignty in this
country?
The roots of Indian sovereignty are in the freedom tribes enjoyed
prior to colonization and the history of their struggle to preserve
their cultures and self-governing powers. 3 It is a story of
2

3

Williams, supranote 1, at 986-87.
See Fredricks, supra note 1, at 349, which states:
Tribal sovereignty, then, essentially means freedom. An
independence which allows Indian people to make and be
governed by their own laws, to control the social, economic and
political forces within the territory they occupy, to practice their
religion and sustain their culture free of constraints. The various
groups of native people historically possessed absolute
sovereignty in the traditional legal sense.... [W]ith the exception
of the federal policy supporting tribal self-government, every
single federal Indian policy, from attempted assimilation to
termination, has failed miserably. These federal policies have
failed primarily because of resistance from the Indian tribes
themselves, and their steadfast refusal to part with what remains
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perseverance in the face of unthinkable adversity. 4 The roots of
U.S. law regarding Indians may be in John Marshall's opinions,
but the roots of Indian sovereignty are not. Therefore, the question
for the U.S. is not how much sovereignty to grant the tribes, but
how much longer colonization will continue. Tribes have resisted
domination by mainstream values and law for hundreds of years.
Thus, the legal questions of sovereignty doctrine in federal Indian
law ask how far the United States wants to push domination of the
tribes and in what ways it will recognize and defend their
sovereign power and unique historical roots.
B.

Inherent Territorial Tribal Sovereignty and the
Canons of Construction at the Foundation of
Federal Indian Law: The Cherokee Case

The traditional conception of Indian tribal sovereignty
accords with what most people think sovereignty involves:
governmental power over a discrete territory. This view of
sovereignty was firmly endorsed by Chief Justice Marshall near
the dawn of the United States. Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall
laid the foundation for the concept of retained sovereignty in U.S.
law. Retained sovereignty is the notion that Indian tribes began as
sovereign peoples and lost only those elements expressly divested
through a treaty or, in later cases, a statute. Those elements of
sovereignty not expressly divested were retained. Finally, Chief
Justice Marshall's opinions formed the basis of the Indian law
canons of construction, which serve to protect the tribes through
construal of treaties and statutes as the tribes themselves would
have understood them.
The case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia5 was initiated by
the Cherokee Nation to prevent Georgia from enforcing its law on
of their land base and their sovereignty.
number of historical studies document the cruelty and devastation inflicted
on Indian people of the territory that would become the United States. One
powerful telling of the history is DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST:
THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD 98-146 (1992).
'30U.S. 1(1831).
4A
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the reservation. Justice Marshall looked to history and determined
that "[t]he acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee
nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts." 6
Nonetheless, Marshall questioned whether the Cherokee nation
was a foreign state that could invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. In deciding that tribes are not foreign nations,
Marshall recognized an "unquestionable" right to their lands. He
also determined that rather than being foreign nations,
[Indians] may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependant nations.
They
occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will, which must take effect in
point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.7
This portion of Marshall's opinion is the basis of the status of
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations," which has renewed
importance in federal Indian law since 1978, and of the guardianward relationship between the United States and the tribes. It also
contains a characterization of the Indians as pupils that is both
degrading and, because of the temporary nature of pupilage, a
shaky foundation for permanent protection of tribal interests.
Chief Justice Marshall discussed tribal sovereignty as
territorial sovereignty in Worcester v. Georgia.8 The case arose as
a challenge by a missionary from Vermont who was convicted
under a Georgia law that forbade non-Indians from entering onto
the Cherokee reservation without permission from the state of
Georgia, even though he had the support of the federal
6 Id. at 16.
7 Id. at 17.
8 31 U.S. 515

(1832).
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government. The Court held that Georgia law had no force on the
reservation because the Cherokees were "under the protection of
the United States, and of no other power." 9 In reaching this
conclusion, Marshall established principles that later became0
central to Indian law and concepts of territorial sovereignty.'
Marshall's discussion analogized the federal-Indian relationship to
the relationship of a weaker and stronger nation in the international
arena, such that Indians were under the protection of the U.S., but
did not "surrender" the sovereign powers associated with nations.II
Marshall interpreted the treaty at issue with attention to the intent
of both parties, placing a notable emphasis on the perspective of
the Indian tribe. For example, Marshall supported the notion of
reserved sovereignty through his interpretation of the term
"allotted," which was used in the treaty as a designation for the
lands retained by the Cherokees. Marshall stated that the Indians
"might not understand the term employed" to suggest they were
receiving, rather than granting, land. 12 . Thus, "allotted" was
construed "in the sense it was most obviously
used," to express a
3
U.S.'
the
to
Cherokee
the
by
land grant
The canons of construction, which many scholars have
regarded as fundamental principles of federal Indian law, grow out
of Marshall's opinions. 14 The canons of construction require that
ambiguous expressions be construed in favor of the Indians, that
interpretation follow the meaning most likely ascribed by the
Indians, and that treaties be liberally construed in favor of the
Indians. These canons were originally applied to treaties, but have
since become important to interpretation of statutes concerning
Indians. The canons grow out of a recognition, clearly expressed
in Worcester and numerous subsequent cases, that Indians did not
9 Id. at 552.

toProfessor Phillip P. Frickey, for example, describes Worcester as "the most

important decision in federal Indian law." Phillip P. Frickey, A Common Law
for OurAge of Imperialism: The JudicialDivestitureof Indian Tribal Authority
Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L. J. 1, 10 (1999).
1"Worcester, 31 U.S. at 506-61.
12Id. at 553.
13Id.

14See Frickey, supra note 10, at 10.
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always understand the subtleties of the English words and U.S.
legal concepts used by representatives of the United States who
often sought to take advantage of them.
The doctrine of retained inherent sovereignty also grows
out of the Marshall decisions. It maintains that Indians were
sovereign powers whose treaties specify the extent to which
sovereignty was surrendered. That which was not surrendered was
retained and, thus, remains with the tribe. This foundation
principle recognizes that the sovereignty of tribes grows from their
status as an independent people, not from the grace of the United
States government. It has, however, been subsequently altered to
recognize the plenary power of Congress to unilaterally divest
tribes of their sovereign powers.
C.

The Role of Foundation Principles in U.S. Law

In the years since Chief Justice Marshall's foundation
decisions, most scholars recognize a pattern of protection of tribal
interests through the foundation principles. This is not to say that
the Court has been a loyal supporter of tribal interest. Rather, the
Court has declined to diminish tribal sovereignty on its own
power. 15 Further, the federal courts have generally adhered to the
concept of territorial sovereignty, although Supreme Court cases
on this point are relatively scarce and a degree of state regulation
on the reservations occurred without protest from the tribes. The
courts recognized the plenary power of Congress to unilaterally
divest or re-arrange tribal sovereign powers, but did not find such
divestiture in a particular case without a relatively clear expression
of congressional intent.
From the late nineteenth century until at least the 1920s,
Congress followed the policy expressed by the 1887 Allotment
15 See, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New

Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84
(1996).

CALIF.

L. REV. 1573, 1586
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Act. 6 By individual acts relating to a particular tribe, Congress
broke up land held in trust for the tribe and allotted individual
parcels to individual Indians. Large portions of the reservation
were then offered as allotments to non-Indians. This policy sought
to destroy the tribes as cultural and governmental entities. While it
permanently fractured many reservations and substantially
weakened many tribes, the allotment policy failed to destroy the
cultural identity of most tribes and their will to exercise sovereign
power over their own destiny.
Following the allotment policy, Congress enacted many of
the principles advocated by the early twentieth century scholar
Felix Cohen. Congress adopted his emphasis on the importance of
tribal sovereignty when it passed the Indian Reorganization Act
("IRA"). 17 This act recognized tribal sovereignty and embraced
the foundation principles announced by Chief Justice Marshall.
The policy of the IRA was to reinvigorate tribal governments and
promote Indian self-government.
Congress again shifted direction in 1953 by expressly
promoting the termination of Indian tribes and the dispersal of
Indian peoples from the reservations.' 8
This policy was
devastating to some tribes, who literally ceased to exist because of
the policy. The policy promoted other congressional action aimed
at assimilation, such as Public Law 280, which provided for
extensive state jurisdiction over reservations in specific
states and
9
gave the option of such jurisdiction to other states.'
Finally, in 1970 President Nixon endorsed a policy of selfdetermination for Indian tribes that Congress then embraced. 2 °
This policy has given rise to the Indian Self-Determination Act and
388 (1887) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-381 (1983)); see
Fredricks, supra note 1, at 372-74; see also DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 141-90 (4th ed. 1998).
17 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461-479); see
Fredricks, supra note 1, at 374-76; see also GETCHES, supra note 15, at 191-203.
18 See Fredricks, supra note 1, at 376-79; see also GETCHES, supra note 15, at
204-24.
16 24 Stat.

'918 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994).
20 See Fredricks, supra note 1, at 379-85; see also GETCHES, supra note 15, at

224-55.
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numerous programs designed to encourage tribal self-government.
Under this policy, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) provides for
of
guarantees in tribal courts similar to those contained in the Bill
2
1
impose.
can
courts
tribal
that
sentences
the
restricts
and
Rights
Throughout all of these shifts in congressional policy, the
Court has upheld congressional action. For most of the time
between Chief Justice Marshall's decisions and the late 1950s,
however, the Court did not even suggest that territorial sovereignty
could be disturbed without express congressional divestiture.
Instead, the courts acted as referees, interpreting the congressional
acts with the foundation principles as an interpretive guide. As one
scholar maintains, "[s]ince the foundation cases, the Court has
repeatedly refused to place limits on tribal self-government" and
"it was clear that the Court still viewed the reservation boundaries
as barriers to state regulation" in the 1950s. 22 There was, however,
not very much case law on the limits of tribal sovereignty,
23
particularly as it related to jurisdiction over non-Indians.
D.

The Rise of Status-Based Sovereignty: Williams
and McClanahan

In 1959, the Court announced a new approach to resolving
questions of tribal sovereignty in Williams v. Lee. 24 The case
involved the authority of the state of Arizona to hear a debt
a
collection claim arising out of transactions at a store owned by 25
Reservation.
Indian
Navajo
the
on
located
non-Indian that was
In an opinion by Justice Black, the Court described Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Worcester as "one of his most courageous
and eloquent opinions" and reaffirmed its "basic policy" that state

22

82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03).
Getches, supra note 15, at 1586, 1589.

23

See id. at 1588.

21

24 358

25

U.S. 217 (1959).

1Id. at 217.
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law has no effect on the reservation, with some exceptions.
Williams endorsed the following approach: "[e]ssentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them., 27 The Court
concluded, "there can be no doubt" that to allow collection of the
debt incurred by Indians on the Navajo reservation in the state
court would "undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs. 28
The approach established in Williams was new in that it
looked not exclusively to the territory involved, but also to the
tribal interest at stake. The case can be described as a vindication
of tribal sovereignty in the modern context. 29 It reaffirmed the
foundation principles and established exclusive jurisdiction in the
tribal courts for commercial cases arising from transactions on the
reservation. A very similar issue came before the Court again less
than fifteen years later, after states had been interpreting Williams
to require evidence of direct harm to the tribe before tribal
jurisdiction would be required.3 °
In 1973, the Court outlined a pre-emption approach to tribal
sovereignty that reaffirmed the foundation principles and the
concerns expressed in Williams. In McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm'n of Ariz.,3 1 Justice Marshall held for the Court that an
Arizona tax imposed on Navajo individuals who reside on the
reservation and derive their income from the reservation
"interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes
leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the
Indians themselves." 3 In the course of the opinion, the Court
reaffirmed the foundation principles first announced by Chief

"6Id.at 218-19.
27 Id. at 220.
28 Id. at 223.
29

See Getches, supra note 15, at 1589.

See id. at 1590 (describing this as a perversion of Williams).
" 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
32 Id. at 165.
30
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Justice Marshall.33 The Court recognized that Indian sovereignty
had not remained static and that state law was not wholly excluded
from the reservation. In this light, the Court advanced "reliance on
federal pre-emption" as an approach to defining the extent to
which state law applied on reservations. 34 Nonetheless, Justice
Marshall stated that tribal sovereignty "provides a backdrop
against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read."35
II.

THE SUPREME

COURT'S

DIVESTITURE

OF

SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH DEPENDENT STATUS,

TRIBAL

1978-2001

Beginning in 1978, the Supreme Court assumed an active
role in divesting tribes of sovereign power. In Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,36 the Court resurrected a doctrine that had
not been used in nearly 150 years to find that Indian tribes do not
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because of their
37
dependent status. Three years later, in Montana v. United States,
the Court extended the Oliphant principle to civil regulatory
jurisdiction over reservation land owned in fee by non-Indians.
While these cases certainly had a wide impact when decided, the
full extent of the changes wrought through the principles they
expressed has only become clear, to the extent that it is clear,
through the Court's subsequent reliance on these principles. In
1990, the Court held in Duro v. Reina 38 that Indians do not have
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but only over
members. This holding so conflicted with the need for effective
authority on the reservations that Congress subsequently passed a
law reinstating such jurisdiction and explicitly referred to the
33Id. at
34

168.

Id. at 171-72.
3 Id. at 172.
36 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
3'450 U.S. 544 (1981).
38 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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case. 39 Regarding civil powers of the tribe, the Court subsequently
read Montana to require a finding of divestiture of tribal regulatory
authority whenever Congress has "broadly opened [trust] land to
non-Indians." 40 The Court then limited tribal adjudicative
jurisdiction to the scope of its regulatory jurisdiction. 4 1 Finally, in
2001, the Court held that tribes do not have jurisdiction to hear a
member's tort and civil rights claims against state officials acting
outside of their official capacity on tribally-owned reservation
land. 42 The Court reached out to divest tribes of power in these
cases with near complete indifference to congressional intent.
The United States Supreme Court opened a new frontier for
stripping tribes of their sovereign powers. Montana forms the new
basis for Supreme Court Indian law decisions, under which it is
now exceedingly difficult to predict the outer limits of divesture
that the Oliphant and Montana principles will support. It is
particularly striking that the Supreme Court, despite its cautious
role in Indian law for over one hundred years, serves as the
primary agent of this imperialistic undertaking. These cases
created a fundamental revision of the role of the Court and of
sovereignty in federal Indian law.
A.

Foundation of the Court's New Indian Law:
Oliphant and Montana
1. Oliphant: A Radical Shift in the Law of Inherent
Sovereignty

In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,43 the Court was
faced with the issue of whether the Suquamish tribe had
jurisdiction over two non-Indians, one who had allegedly assaulted
of a tribal police officer and one who had allegedly crashed into a
39 Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.

§ 1301(2)).
40 South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 692 (1993).
41Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
42 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
43 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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tribal police vehicle after a chase. The state could not prosecute,
but the federal government could; therefore, the question was
whether the tribe had concurrent jurisdiction. 44 The Court held that
it did not.45
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court began by
contrasting the past autonomy of the Suquamish and other Indian
tribes with the present "checkerboard" of Indian and non-Indian
land that makes up the Suquamish reservation. 46 The Court
elaborated in a footnote that highlighted the reservation's
demographics: nearly 3000 non-Indians and roughly 50 members
of the Suquamish tribe. 47 The Court then pointed out that
defendants do not receive the protections of the Bill of Rights in
tribal courts.48 On one level, the demographics and due process
issues raised in the first two paragraphs of the opinion explain the
Court's decision on the facts. 49 However, the case was significant
far beyond the Suquamish reservation. Its core principle would
become fundamentally important. The Court held that the inherent
sovereignty of tribes is implicitly divested by their dependent
status. This marked the beginning of a revolution in tribal
sovereignty that threatened its very existence.
Justice Rehnquist's decision in Oliphant has been criticized
for its manipulation of history and precedent, its manipulative
interpretation of treaties and statutes, and its self-arrogation of
44 See Frickey, supra note 10, at 34.
41 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
46Id. at 192-93.
47
1Id. at 193 n.1.

48 Id. at 194 n.3 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
49 See Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the

Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 847-48(1996); see also Frickey, supra
note 10, at 36-37 (stating that "[t]he demographics in Oliphantmade it a horrible
test case for affirming tribal sovereignty in the modem context"). In this
respect, the allotment of the Suquamish reservation played a large role in the
Court's decision. Yet, a sign of congressional intent in favor of Suquamish
jurisdiction, the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), was
simply distinguished in a footnote. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 195 n.6.
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power. For example, Justice Rehnquist relies on a decision from
1878 and a withdrawn opinion of the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior, to show a consistent government belief that tribes
do not retain jurisdiction over non-Indians. 50 The court recounts
history in an attempt to show an "unspoken assumption" to this
effect. 51 The Court also blatantly ignores the canons of
construction, finding that even though a draft of the Suquamish
treaty would have expressly divested criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, and the provision was dropped during negotiations
"for some unexplained reason," it "could well have been
understood" as achieving such divestiture.52
The Court also effectively rejected the doctrine of retained
sovereignty in this context by stating that "an examination of our
earlier precedents satisfies us that... Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such
power by Congress." 53Importantly, the Court reached this
conclusion exclusively through a questionable historical analysis
and stated: "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the
United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their
power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a
manner acceptable to Congress. 54 The Court imposed this
stunning principle and, thereby, severely limited the concept of
retained sovereignty, with minimal recognition of its significance
and virtually no legal support. Justice Rehnquist supported the
above-quoted principle with an assertion that it would have been
obvious when tribal institutions did not mirror U.S. and state court
systems and recorded laws.55 Although the Court stated that its
was
cul~ broke with
decision decision
was required by precedent, 56 iti actually
precedent in both its holding and assertion that treaties and
legislation "must be read in the light of the common notions of the
50 Oliphant,435 U.S. at 199-201.
51

Id. at 203.
Id. at 208 n.16.
53
54 Id. at 208.
Id. at 210.
55 Id.
56 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208..
52
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day and the assumptions of those who drafted them," 57 rather than
interpreted according to the Indian law canons of construction.
The most important part of Oliphant is its holding that
tribal sovereignty which is inconsistent with dependent status is
implicitly divested. The significance of this case may not have
been apparent when it was decided, but subsequent cases have
shown Oliphant to provide a broad, elastic principle capable of
divesting tribal sovereign authority over nonmembers in virtually
any area. The breadth of the principle was greatly enhanced three
years after Oliphant in the case that extended its principle to
matters of civil jurisdiction: Montana v. United States.
2. Montana: Broadening the Scope of the Oliphant
Principle
In Montana v. United States, the Court held (1) that title to
Big Horn River passed to Montana upon statehood and Congress
had not conveyed beneficial ownership to the Crow tribe; 59 and (2)
the inherent sovereignty of the Crow tribe did not empower them
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land owned in
fee by nonmembers. 60 The second part of the holding relied on
Oliphant for "the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe" with two exceptions: where the
nonmember has entered into a consensual relationship with the
tribe, or when the conduct of nonmembers within the reservation
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.",6 1 By
announcing this "general proposition," the Court dramatically
57Id. at 206.

450 U.S. 544 (1981).
59

60
61

Id. at 556-57.

Id. at 564-65.

Id. at 565-66.
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expanded the principle developed in Oliphant. Although Oliphant
was the only other case since the 1830s to find implicit divestiture
based on the dependent status of the tribes, Justice Stewart's
opinion for the Court in Montana suggested that
its holding on this
62
basis was required by a long line of precedent.
The case arose from the Crow Tribe's attempt to prohibit
hunting and fishing by nonmembers on all lands within the borders
of the reservation, including on land held in fee by nonmembers.
Similar to the recitation of demographics in Oliphant, the Court
stated that, as a result of allotment, 28 percent of the reservation
land was held in fee by non-Indians, 52 percent was in trust for
individual members, and 17 percent was in trust for the tribe.63 It
also stated that Montana had stocked the Big Horn River with fish
since the 1920s. 64 It has been suggested that the Court stated such
facts "to implicitly invoke liberal ideas of fairness rather than to
further any substantive Indian law discussion." 65 The Court relied
on the extensive allotment of the Crow reservation to find that
treaty language guaranteeing "absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation" did not allow regulation of hunting and fishing on land
bwned in fee by non-Indians.6 6 This portion of Montana apparently
relies on congressional intent, albeit the intent of a long repudiated
policy.
The Court's reasoning in Montana suggested that precedent
required its holding. This is a continuation of the technique used
in Oliphant to obscure the radical shift in Indian law and the role
of the Court wrought by these decisions. The Court relies on
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Fletcher v. Peck,67 which
was also cited in Oliphant, for the principle that "Indian tribes have
lost any 'right of governing every person within their limits except
themselves.'"68 Despite the fact that the Court relies heavily on the
62 Id. at
63

1Id.at

564-66.
548.

64 Id.
65

Tweedy, supra note 50, at 157.

66

Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59.
10 U.S. 87 (1810).

67

68 Montana, 450

U.S. at 565 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209).
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concept that tribes are "dependent nations," there is no effort to
address the other aspects of Marshall's opinions. The Court does
not even mention that more than twenty years after Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Fletcher, Chief Justice Marshall issued
several opinions for the Court that discussed sovereignty in
absolute territorial terms. Nor does it mention that the principles
from those cases have been almost universally interpreted as the
foundation of federal Indian law, while Justice Jackson's
concurrence has received little attention. Looking at Montana and
Oliphant from a historical perspective, a reader must recognize that
the Court is revising the meaning of precedent. In each case, the
Court connects its opinion with early precedent opposed to the
traditional foundation principles and then cites recent precedent
for
69
cases.
cited
the
in
discussed
expressly
points that were not
What is fundamentally important about Montana is that it
brought the presumption against inherent sovereignty to bear on
civil regulatory power. Montana has become more damaging to
tribal sovereignty than Oliphant because it has much broader
implications. It brought the Oliphantprinciple to bear in civil law
and, though it may not have been apparent at the time, allows for
nearly limitless expansion. Essentially, Montana reversed the
notion of retained sovereignty, replacing it in all contexts with the
notion that: "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes, and so cannot
survive without express congressional delegation. 7 ° In later cases,
the Court would view Montana as the "pathmarking case ' 71 and
apply the above principle broadly. In Montana the Court created
an analytical method that enables a court to find a power
inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes and conclude that
the power is implicitly divested, unless Congress has affirmatively
69
70

Id. at 564-65; Oliphant,435 U.S. at 206-08.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.

71See, e.g., Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997).
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granted the power.
On its face, Montana promises that the most important
aspects of sovereignty remain intact. It states that tribes may
exercise regulatory control over non-Indians when the conduct in
question has a direct effect on the tribe's self-governing power.
However, subsequent cases have proven this to be a very narrow,
perhaps nonexistent, area of regulatory power. In Montana itself,
there is some evidence that this exception has no force. The Court
states that "regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of a
tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations. 72 The
court justifies this conclusion in a footnote, explaining that the
District Court found that the state of Montana traditionally
exercised nearly exclusive regulatory power over hunting and
fishing on fee lands within the reservation.73 The problems with
this reasoning are obvious. First, as past courts and numerous
scholars have observed, the states and tribes often have opposing
interests.74 The role of the United States, traditionally, was to
protect tribal interests against incursions by the state. Montana
arose as such a case. The United States initiated it on behalf of the
tribe as a declaratory judgment action to solidify the tribe's power.
Second, the Court completely fails to explain why Montana's past
assertion of power influences the legal decision. That is, why does
Montana's regulation show there is no direct effect on the tribe?
The tribe apparently believed there was a direct effect, or it would
not have asserted its own power to regulate. The Court was faced
with two independent governments asserting regulatory control
over the same area. The fact that one has traditionally dominated
does nothing to show that such domination "bears no clear
relationship to tribal self-government." 75 Thus, before the Court
72

Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.

73

1Id. at 564 n.13.
74 See e.g., Williams,

375, 384 (1886).

supra note 1; see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.

Id. at 564. One might also ask why such a relationship has to be "clear."
Certainly, profound effects may occur that require some investigation or
consideration to understand.
75
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even announced the second exception, it was cast aside with
nothing more than a conclusory footnote.
B.

Application of the New Indian Law

The principles developed in Oliphant and Montana have
directed the Supreme Court's Indian law decisions since their
creation. In the most recent cases, the Court's opinions rely on
those principles as a foundation. From the concept of implicit
divestiture by dependent status, the Court crafted expansive rules
for when tribes have lost sovereign power. At the same time, the
Montana exceptions have been narrowed to the extent that it
appears the Supreme Court would never find them satisfied.
Apparently, the divestiture principles created in Oliphant and
Montana constitute a new Indian law, although the Court has never
acknowledged that traditional principles of Indian law are in
conflict with its new principles.
1. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes: A Split Opinion
that Suggests Tribes Retain Full Jurisdiction Over
Land Only if it Remains Primitive
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation,76 the Court held that the Yakima tribes'
sovereign power included the power to zone part of the
reservation, but did not include the power to zone another part.
The issue was whether the tribe or the county had authority to zone
lands within the reservation held in fee by non-Indians. The case
involved two individuals who sought to develop fee-owned
property within the reservation, which was allowed by county
zoning law and not allowed by tribal zoning law. Brendale, a
nonmember of the tribe, sought to develop property within the
relatively undeveloped "closed area." Wilkinson, a non-Indian,
76 492

U.S. 408 (1989).
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sought to develop property in the more developed "open area,"
which was located near the border of the reservation and the town
of Yakima.77 The ultimate holding of the case recognized tribal
authority to zone the closed part of the reservation, but not the
open area. This holding grew from three separate opinions, one
which would have completely divested the tribe of the power to
zone land held in fee by non-Indians,78 one which conditioned the
power to zone on the power to exclude and, thus, held that the tribe
had lost authority to zone the more developed part of the
reservation and had retained authority over the less developed
part,79 and one that would have found exclusive power to zone on
the reservation in the tribe.8 ° Justice White's opinion, which found
complete divestiture, demonstrates the power of implicit
divestiture and the weakness of Montana's exceptions. In this
regard, it was a precursor of the Court's approach in later cases.
Justice Stevens' opinion devalued tribal sovereignty by
conditioning it on the landowner's power to exclude and, thereby,
illustrates the fairly bizarre conceptions of "sovereignty" that the
Court has been willing to apply to tribal powers. It also suggests
an implicit condition for tribal sovereignty: Indian powers may
depend on the "Indian-ness" of the area in question, as measured
by the non-Indian conception of "Indian-ness." Finally, Justice
Blackmun's opinion recognized the significance of zoning
authority to the tribe's ability to effectively govern. As a whole,
the case illustrates the Court's struggle with the meaning and
extent of retained tribal sovereignty as applied to nonmembers and
non-Indians.
Brendale shows the Court at a crossroads. The opinions
reveal the possible paths that the Oliphant and Montana principle
Id. at 417-19; see also id. at 440-42, 445-48 (concurring opinion authored by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justice O'Connor).
78 Id. at 414-33 (lead opinion authored by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
77

Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy).
79 Id. at 433-48 (concurring opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justice O'Connor).
80
Id. at 448-68 (concurring opinion authored by Justice Blackmun and joined by
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall).

2004-2005

New Frontierof FederalIndian Law

left open to the Court. The Blackmun opinion embodies the
traditional concepts of sovereignty as they could be applied
following Montana, but this is not the path the Court would follow
in later cases. The opinion of Justice White expanded the general
principles of implicit divestiture in Oliphant and Montana, while
emasculating the second Montana exception. This is very close to
the path the Court would follow. Justice Stevens' opinion is
revealing in one very important respect. It shows that the Court
may limit Indian sovereignty to those instances that conform to
some stereotypical non-Indian conception of "Indian-ness." In this
way, and through the emphasis on a landowner's power to exclude,
Justice Stevens' opinion suggests that Indian sovereignty will be
measured by consistency with Anglo-American legal concepts and
pre-conceptions of what an Indian is.
Justice White's opinion would have completely divested
the tribes of authority to regulate nonmember land, with some rare
exceptions. Initially, Justice White rejected the argument that the
Yakima treaty language, retaining "exclusive use and benefit" for
the tribe, controlled. s2 Instead, Justice White found that this
language was implicitly abrogated by the allotment of the
reservation. 83 Justice White then turned to inherent sovereignty.
He read Montana and other cases to have meant that although
some inherent sovereignty is retained, it "is divested to the extent it
is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status, that is, to the
extent it involves a tribe's 'external relations. ' '84 Without an
express delegation of power by Congress, Justice White
maintained that the Yakima Nation had no authority to impose
zoning regulation on land owned by nonmembers. 85 Justice
81 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432.
82

1Id. at
83 Id.
84 Id. at
85

422.

425-26 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
Id. at 428. One commentator maintains that the Justices who endorsed this

view misconstrued the Montana case that they had personally decided and, thus,
their "misconstrual of the case indicates their personal bias shrinking tribal
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White's opinion proposed a severe limitation on the second
Montana exception (the exception stating that tribes retain
authority to regulate nonmembers where a direct effect on their
power of self-government is involved). The opinion characterized
the exception as discretionary, such that the regulatory power is
not an aspect of retained sovereignty, but may be a "protectible
86
interest" in the particular activities occurring on the reservation.
This interest must involve a "demonstrably serious" effect on the
tribe, which federal courts could protect.8 7 Justice White
maintained that the tribe had no sovereign authority to zone the
lands of nonmembers, but should appeal to the local zoning boards
and then, if necessary, to the federal courts on a case-by-case basis
where "demonstrably serious" effects would flow from a particular
use of nonmember land. 8 The approach proposed in Justice9
White's opinion, which was joined by three other Justices,8
recognizing no tribal sovereign authority over nonmembers, but an
interest the federal courts could, in their discretion, protect on a
case-by-case basis, leaves Indian tribes with little more power than
any organization that regulates its members. This would leave the
tribes with something hardly capable of being called
''sovereignty."
Justice Stevens' opinion also creates a sort of power that is
hardly recognizable as "sovereignty." This opinion led to the
facially odd result of tribal power to zone in one part of the
reservation, but not in another. Justice Stevens would ground
sovereignty entirely in the power to exclude. The first sentences of
his opinion read:
The United States has granted to many Indian tribes,
including the Yakima Nation 'a power unknown to any
other sovereignty in this Nation: a power to exclude
sovereignty at any cost." Tweedy, supra note 50, at 163.
86
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430 (White, J.).
87Id.at 431.
88 Id.
89 Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy.
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nonmembers entirely from territory reserved.' That
power necessarily must include the lesser power to
regulate land use in the interest of protecting the tribal
community. Thus, the proper resolution of these cases
depends on the extent to which the Tribe's virtually
absolute power to exclude has been either diminished
by federal statute or voluntarily surrendered by the
Tribe itself.90
Justice Stevens apparently rejects the notion of retained
sovereignty because he characterized the power to exclude as a
power "granted" by the United States. Further, Justice Stevens'
opinion maintained that inherent sovereignty is no larger than the
power to exclude recognized in a treaty, which itself may have
been implicitly diminished by Congress. Justice Stevens points
directly to the Allotment Act as diminishing tribal authority. 9'
Thus, the opinion described an emasculated sovereignty granted by
the United States and based on the power of an ordinary
landowner.
With regard to the closed portion of the reservation, Justice
Stevens found that the tribe had authority to "preserve the
character of what remains almost entirely a region reserved for the
exclusive benefit of the Tribe." 92 Its authority to regulate the land
owned by nonmembers in this area was "simply incidental" to this
power. Justice Stevens emphasized the value of the undeveloped
land to the tribe and the tribe's consistent regulation of the area,
but did not promote a strong view of sovereignty. He maintained
that the burden of tribal regulation on a nonmember is like an
equitable servitude. 93 The burden was required by the tribe's
90 Id. at

433 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

455 U.S. 130, 160 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
9'
Id. at 436-37.
92
Id. at 443.
9' Brendale,492 U.S. at 442.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXIII

"general plan to preserve this 94unique resource" for use according to
the tribe's traditional culture.
On the other hand, Justice Stevens found no need for tribal
regulation where a considerable amount of development has
occurred. He maintained that because the tribe lost the power to
exclude, it lost the power to define the essential character of the
land. For Justice Stevens, this means that "the Tribe's interest in
preventing inconsistent uses is dramatically curtailed. 95 For that
reason, he agreed with Justice White's analysis for the open part of
the reservation.
Justice Stevens' opinion grounded tribal regulatory power
in the power to exclude and suggested that this power is retained
only where the tribe has maintained it in an undeveloped state for
traditional use. While this is somewhat more protective than
Justice White's view, it also contains a disturbing undercurrent of
cultural imperialism. This view implicitly maintains that Indians
may keep areas primitive for use that fits within pre-conquest
traditions, but lose regulatory power over lands that are used for
the advancement of the tribe through modern economic
development. Thus, Justice Stevens' opinion seems to create a
division between Indians as a traditional people and Indian tribes
as governmental bodies. It endorses traditionalism and may
undercut the ability of tribes to continue to grow according to their
own culture. One could read this opinion to suggest that Indian
tribes retain power to stay as they were before conquest, but cannot
constitute modern governments as to nonmembers for any other
purpose. Also, the opinion may inhibit sovereignty because it
conditions tribal sovereign power on the Anglo-American concept
of a landowner's power to exclude. True sovereignty would allow
tribes to use their own concepts to govern, rather than conditioning
it on satisfaction of a requirement drawn from U.S. property law.
Justice Blackmun's opinion represents a protective view of
tribal sovereignty. In the years since Brendale, this perspective has
disappeared from the Court. Justice Blackmun recognized that
94

Id.at 441.
9'Id. at 445.
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"Montana strangely reversed the otherwise consistent presumption
in favor of inherent tribal sovereignty over reservation lands...
,,96 Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun found that the second Montana
exception should control in both the open and closed areas because
zoning is a quintessential example of a power that is required for
the economic security, health, and welfare of the tribe. 97 Justice
Blackmun also sharply criticized the other opinions in the case. He
maintained that Justice White's opinion "presents not a single
thread of logic" to show that tribal zoning of the entire reservation
is inconsistent with federal interests or that the power is not
98
fundamental to the political and economic security of the tribe.
He stated that Justice White's opinion sacrifices recognized tribal
rights, precedent, and federal policy when it "replaces sovereignty
with a form of legal tokenism" in the form of an opportunity to sue
in court. 9 9 Justice Blackmun had similarly sharp criticism of
Justice Stevens' opinion. He stated that it proposes an approach to
tribal sovereignty that is inconsistent with precedent, based on
unsupported conjecture about congressional intent, and was
"generally unsound." 00
Notably, Justice Stevens' opinion in Brendale, divorced as
it may be from cases embracing territorial sovereignty and the
Oliphant and Montana implicit divestiture principle, was discussed
with approval in South Dakota v. Bourland.l0 l Here, the Court
held that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe did not have the power
to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land within the
reservation taken by the United States for the Oahe Dam and
Reservoir Project. 10 2 In Bourland, Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, held that when the federal government took the land and
96 Id.
at
97

456 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Id.at 458.

98 Id.
at

462.

99 Id.

Id. at 465.
508 U.S. 679, 688-89 (1993).
102 Id. at 697-98.
'
10
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opened it up for public use, Congress "eliminated the Tribe's
power to exclude non-Indians from these lands" and, thus,
eliminated the regulatory authority over nonmembers.' 0 3 Bourland
also found that inherent sovereignty did not support regulatory
jurisdiction, but left the question of whether the second
Montana
04
exception applied, for the District Court on remand. 1
3. Duro v. Reina: Creating a Lawless Void Through
Divestiture
In Duro v. Reina, 105 the Court held that Indian tribes do not
have criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.' 0 6 In this case, the
Court "effectively made reservations ungovernable" because
federal prosecution of all the minor crimes of nonmembers on
reservations was extremely unlikely. 10 7 This problem was so
apparent that Congress enacted a statute to re-instate tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.' 0 8 The case powerfully
illustrates the Court's indifference to the effects of its decision on
reservations. It also demonstrates the apparent dominance of the
Court's concern over "intrusion[s] on [the] personal liberty' 0 9 of
U.S. citizens. Essentially, the Court's decision states that the
importance of protecting nonmember Indians from -tribal
jurisdiction, regardless of the ties between the tribe and the
defendant, outweighs the value of providing effective law
'03 Id. at 689.
'04 Id. at 694-96.
105 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
106
Id.at 685.
107 Tweedy, supranote 50, at 167.

108 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4). This congressional
response has not come before the Court since enactment. It raises a number of

interesting questions concerning the balance of powers. One might also
question whether distinguishing between Indians and non-Indians for purposes
of jurisdiction is justifiable, but, unless the Oliphant rule changes, it may be
necessary in order to provide some deterrent and punishment for minor crime on
the reservation. On Duro and the congressional response, see generally
GETCHES, supra note 16, at 540-4 1.
109 Duro, 495 US at 963.
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enforcement for minor crimes on the reservation. The basis of the
decision is Oliphant, under which the Court was able to frame the
issue as whether nonmember Indians deserve0 the same
"protection" from tribal jurisdiction as non-Indians." l
Duro's facts made the importance of the issue clear. The
defendant, a resident of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa reservation,
was charged with illegal discharge of a firearm that resulted in the
death of a fourteen-year-old boy. The tribe was unable to bring
more serious charges due to the restrictions in ICRA. The federal
government did not prosecute the defendant. As a result of the
Court's decision, the defendant was never prosecuted for anything.
Further, at the time Duro was decided, over a third of the residents
on the most populous allotted reservations were nonmembers."'
Thus, the effect of the decision on the ability to prosecute for the
violent death of one boy was just the surface of problems Duro
would create.
This problem was one explicit reason the Ninth Circuit had
held in favor of tribal jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court noted,
the Ninth Circuit had stated "that failure to recognize tribal
' ', 12
jurisdiction over petitioner would create a 'jurisdictional void.
The Court rejected this argument. It pointed to possible state and
federal jurisdiction and, in the end, stated that if such a
jurisdictional void exists "the proper body to address the problem
is Congress."' 1 3 For a variety of reasons, Congress did address the
problem by undoing the decision in Duro. Nonetheless, with this
decision the Court made plain its refusal to give any serious
attention to the effect of its decision on tribes.
The Court's decision may be viewed as an attempt to bring
110 In a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan argued that Oliphant
was based on congressional intent regarding non-Indians. The dissent did not
view Oliphant as establishing a broad principle that tribes do not have
jurisdiction over nonmembers. Id. at 700-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11I
See Gould, supra note, 49, at 852.
11
2 Duro, 495 U.S. at 683.
113 Id. at 698.
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tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in line with the
Constitution."14 After discussing the historical record regarding the
tribe's jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, the Court stated,
"[w]hatever might be said of the historical record, we must view it5
in light of petitioner's status as a citizen of the United States.""
The Court read precedent to suggest limits on the authority of even
Congress to "subject American citizens to criminal proceedings
does not provide constitutional protections as
before a tribunal that
' "16
right."
of
a matter
The Court distinguished between members and
nonmembers on the -basis of consent. According to the Court,
tribal jurisdiction over members is "justified by the voluntary
character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of
participation in a tribal government." ' 1 7 The Court then recognized
that "tribes are not mere fungible groups," something it has very
rarely done, in order to reject the notion that members of one tribe
may be subject to the jurisdiction of another. 18 The Court also
rejected any contacts analysis of consent because it would apply to
non-Indians as well as nonmember Indians." 9 There is virtually no
further discussion of the issue. Thus, the Court would apparently
find that a nonmember individual who voluntarily spent most of
his life on a reservation and actively participated in the tribal
community could never be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of
the tribe. Inability to participate in government is the most
significant basis for extending Oliphant to nonmember Indians.
Certainly, there is reason to explore this concern. However, the
Court does not explore it or weigh it against other concerns, but
rather, uses it to trump anything that suggests a different result.
4. Strate v. A-] Contractors: Restricting Adjudicatory
"4

See Gould, supra note 49, at 853.
Duro, 495 U.S. at 692.

"'
1l6Id.at
117 Id. at
118Id.at
119Id.

693.

694.

695.

2004-2005

New Frontierof FederalIndian Law
Jurisdiction and Expanding Montana

In Strate v. A-i Contractors,120 the Court held that tribal
courts may not hear claims against nonmembers arising out of
accidents on state highways that run through the tribe's
reservation, unless there is express congressional delegation.121 To
reach this holding the Court defined the limits of tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction. It stated: "[a]s to nonmembers, we hold,
a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction."' 122 With very little further explanation, the Court,
thereby, stripped tribes of most adjudicative jurisdiction over
nonmembers.
The case arose from an accident on a North Dakota state
highway running through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
The accident involved a non-Indian woman whose deceased
husband and five children were tribal members, and a non-Indian
driving a gravel truck owned by his employer, who was
contracting with a tribal corporation to do landscaping on the
reservation. 123 The woman sustained serious injuries and sued
both the driver and his employer in tribal court. 124 Tribal
jurisdiction was unsuccessfully challenged in the District Court.
The Eighth Circuit initially affirmed. Then, upon rehearing, the
Circuit court reversed the District Court through application of
Montana.125 In the Supreme Court's opinion, Justice Ginsburg
focused on the principle developed in Oliphant and, more directly,
Montana's expansion of that principle. 126 First, however, the
Court needed to address two cases that seemed to authorize tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers by requiring exhaustion of remedies
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
442.
122
Id.at 453.
123 Id. at 442-43.
124 Id. at 443.
125 Id. at 444-45.
120

121Id. at

126

Id. at 445-47.
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in tribal court prior to challenging tribal court jurisdiction in
federal court. Those cases, National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v
Crow Tribe 127 and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,128 were the
basis of the District Court's decision to uphold tribal
sovereignty. 129 The problem was this: if National Farmers and
Iowa Mutual controlled and tribal courts therefore presumptively
have broad jurisdiction over nonmembers, how can regulatory
jurisdiction be implicitly divested in most cases, as Montana and
Brendale suggested? On the other hand, if Montana controlled,
thus, suggesting very limited regulatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers, why did National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, both
decided after Montana, apparently presume broad adjudicative
jurisdiction? In National Farmers, the Court had distinguished
Oliphant and failed to extend it to civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers.
Justice Ginsburg resolved the inconsistency by
pointing out that Montana applied "only in the absence of a
delegation of tribal authority by treaty or statute"' 3' and stated that
"we do not extract from National Farmers anything more than a
32
prudential exhaustion rule," which is based on comity.'
Once the strength of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual
had been reduced, the Court expanded Montana to establish the
limits of all civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, at least on land not
strictly controlled by the tribe.' 33 Without further explanation, the
Court held that adjudicative jurisdiction is no larger than
regulatory jurisdiction.' 34 Importantly, the Court did not decide
whether civil jurisdiction over nonmembers could attach where the
events giving rise to the case occurred on Indian land within the
reservation.
Yet, the Court found that as long as the state
maintained the highway, which was open to the public, "the Tribes
471 U.S. 845 (1985).
12'480 U.S. 9 (1987).
129 Strate, 520 U.S. at 444.
130 National Farmers,471 U.S. at 852-56.
127

'

Strate, 520 U.S.'at 449.

132Id.

at 450, 453. At least one commentator maintains that this construal of the
cases as consistent was disingenuous. See Tweedy, supra note 50, at 168.
133 Strate,520 U.S. at 453.
134 Id.
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cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude" and,
therefore, the right-of-way was considered equivalent to alienation
to non-Indians.' 35 The Court had made Montana applicable and,
thereby, created a presumption against jurisdiction. All that
remained were the Montana exceptions.
One might think Strate presented a good case for finding a
consensual relationship that gave rise to tribal power under the first
Montana exception. The defendant was on the reservation because
of his employment with a company that had contracted with a
tribal corporation. The Court simply stated that the alleged
tortious conduct did not fit the exception, that the plaintiff was not
a party to36the contract, and that the tribe was not involved in the
accident. 1
In addressing the second Montana exception, the Court
recognized that "those who drive carelessly on a public highway
running through a reservation.., surely jeopardize the safety of
tribal members."' 37 However, the Court stated that the Montana
exception for activities having a direct effect on political or
economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe "can be
misperceived."' 138 Rather than giving this exception the full
breadth suggested by its plain language, the Court maintained that
a tribe's inherent power never reaches beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government. 139 Essentially, this added to
Montana's presumption against tribal jurisdiction by placing the
burden on tribes to show that not only will an activity have a direct
effect, but tribal authority over it is necessary to control internal
relations. This may be an impossible showing, particularly if there
is some other means of obtaining relief. Not surprisingly, the
Court concluded:
131
Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56.
136 Id. at 456-57.
137Id. at 457-58.
138

Id. at 459.
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Id.
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[o]pening the Tribal Court for [plaintiffs] optional use
is not necessary to protect tribal self-government; and
requiring A-1 and Stockert to defend against this
commonplace state highway accident claim in an
unfamiliar court is not crucial to 'the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
[tribe]." 4
Thus, Strate dramatically expanded Montana. First, it held that
Montana applies on land consensually given by the tribe for public
use, in this case, a state highway through the reservation. Second,
it held that Montana controls adjudicative, as well as regulatory
jurisdiction. Third, it shrunk the potential range of the first
Montana exception by failing to apply it where the defendant was
present on the reservation because of a contract with the tribe.
Fourth, it dramatically reduced the availability of the second
Montana exception by requiring that regulation of a given activity
by nonmembers be necessary to control internal relations or protect
self-government for tribes to have authority over nonmembers.
Despite Justice Ginsburg's numerous recitations of the narrow
focus of the holding, this case had broad consequences in its
guidance on how Montana should be read. This unanimous
decision is a good indication of how truly narrow the Court's
conception of tribal sovereign power over nonmembers is.
5. Nevada v. Hicks:
Divestiture Principles

Dramatic

Expansion

of

The major issue raised by Nevada v. Hicks14 1 was whether
Montana applied on reservation land owned by the tribe. In an
opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court decided that it did. 142 As with
Strate, this opinion demonstrates the dominant place an expansive
reading of Montana holds in the opinions of the current Supreme
140 Id. (quoting

Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).

533 U.S. 353 (2001).
142 Id. at 360.
14
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Court. It also illustrates the virtually nonexistent role that
congressional intent now plays in Supreme Court decisions
regarding the scope of tribal sovereign power.
Nevada v. Hicks arose from suspicion that a tribal member
residing on the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Indian Reservation had
killed an animal protected under Nevada law off of the
reservation. 143 State game wardens obtained a warrant from both
state and tribal court prior to searching his house for the first time.
On a second occasion, warrants from both courts were obtained
prior to the search. Following the search, which revealed no
evidence, the individual brought suit in tribal court against the state
officials, who conducted to the search in their official capacities,
for a variety of civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.144
The defendants challenged tribal court jurisdiction. The District
Court upheld jurisdiction and the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on
the fact that the45respondent's land was tribally-owned and within
the reservation. 1
The Court began its analysis by reaffirming the rule of
Strate: the tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction is no greater than its
regulatory jurisdiction. 146 Therefore, the issue was framed as
whether tribes can "regulate state wardens executing a search
warrant for evidence of an off-reservation crime."'147 Justice Scalia
then plunged into an analysis based on Montana, emphasizing that
"'exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes."",148 Next, the
141

Hicks, 533 U.S. at 356.

144 Id. Plaintiff voluntarily dropped his suit against other defendants named in
the original complaint.

Id. at 357.
id.
14 7 Id. In stating the issue, the Court noted in a footnote that its holding is limited
to tribal jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. Id. at 357 n.2.
148 Id. at 359 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981))
141
146

(emphasis in original).
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Court asserted that there is language in Montana "clearly implying
that the general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and nonIndian land."'' 49 Although this implication was debatable, at the
very least, the Court did not elaborate. Rather, it concluded that
ownership of the land "is only one factor to consider," although
absence of tribal ownership has been "virtually conclusive of the
absence of tribal civil jurisdiction."' 150 The Court prescribed sharp
limits for all tribal sovereign authority by stating: "[t]ribal
assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be
connected to that right of Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them."' 51 This was perhaps the broadest statement of
the Oliphantprinciple to date.
The Court then discussed the status of state law on the
reservation. The state law discussion was probably unnecessary,
since the case did not directly involve the extent to which state law
may apply on the reservation. The state officers requested and
received a warrant from the tribal court. Justice Scalia apparently
emphasized the weight of the state's interest to demonstrate that
state law enforcement does not impede the tribe's power of selfgovernment. He stated: "[t]hough tribes are often referred to as
sovereign entities, it was long ago that the Court departed from
Chief Justice Marshall's view that the laws of [a State] can have no
force within reservation boundaries."' 52 The Court then discussed
several cases and rationales that are said to support state authority
on reservations, including the need to prevent reservations from
becoming an asylum for fugitives. 53 One might respond that an
effective tribal justice system could easily address this concern.
The Court held that the authority to regulate state officers
executing process for off-reservation crimes "is not essential to
tribal self-government or internal relations" because "it no more
impairs the tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of

149
Id.
150 id.
"'
Id. at 361.
152 Id. (internal
53

'

Id. at 362.

quotation marks omitted).
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federal law impairs state government."' 54 Beyond ignoring the
potential harm wrought by state officials acting outside of their
official capacities, this reasoning raises a more striking
assumption. Apparently, Justice Scalia assumed that the difference
between the voluntary federation of states, which created the
federal-state relationship, and genocidal conquest, which created
the relationship between the tribes and the state and federal
governments, bears no relationship to the burden one government
places on the other. There is ample evidence to the contrary. The
Supreme Court stated over one hundred years ago, "[t]he people of
the states where [Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest
enemies."'55 An Indian scholar stated recently, "[h]istory teaches
Indian peoples that in a federal system of government, the white
racial power organized through state governments represents the
gravest and most persistent threat to Indian rights and cultural
survival on this continent."'156 It is difficult to explain how the
Court could make this comparison in good faith. It is strong
evidence of disregard for the requirements of effective tribal
sovereign power.
The Court could have shown more respect by engaging in a
more careful analysis. Instead, it suggested that the state interest
plainly outweighed any potential tribal interest without even
seriously considering the tribal interest. Further, it is not even
clear why the state interest entered the equation. Tribal sovereign
power has never, even in the Oliphant and Montana line of cases
prior to Hicks, been based on an explicit balancing of the state
interest against tribal interests. Additionally, the Court had already
held that tribal jurisdiction was not present, making the entire
discussion unnecessary. Any lingering doubt concerning the
Court's indifference to the tribal interests evaporates upon reading
Justice Scalia's conclusory statement that, "the distinction between
154

Id. at 364.
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United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,384 (1886).
156 Williams, supra note 1, at 987.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXIII

individual and official capacity suits is irrelevant." 157 There was
no further effort to explain why tribal jurisdiction over state
officers acting outside the scope of their authority should be treated
exactly as tribal jurisdiction over state officers acting completely
within their power.
The Court also held that tribal courts do not have
jurisdiction to hear actions based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After
having analogized the federal-state relationship to the tribal-state
relationship, the Court distinguished between the historic
assumption of concurrent state jurisdiction over federal law and the
historic role of tribal courts.1 5 8 The Court stated that tribal courts
are not courts of general jurisdiction, which it asserted "should be
clear" because tribal adjudicative jurisdiction is only as broad as its
legislative jurisdiction. 159 Further, the Court maintained that
because federal statutes do not explicitly provide for removal from
tribal courts, tribal court jurisdiction would be problematic. The
Court did not explain why the creation of a removal power would
be more problematic than precluding tribal jurisdiction.
In Nevada v. Hicks, all nine Justices concurred in the
judgment, though Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer did not
concur in all of the reasoning. Justice Scalia's opinion was the
opinion of six members of the Court. Justice Souter also wrote a
concurrence joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas.
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion to emphasize that the
question of tribal court jurisdiction over action on tribal land by
nonmembers in general, rather than state officers enforcing state
law, was not resolved. Justice O'Connor's opinion, joined by
Justices Stevens and Breyer, disagreed with much of the Court's
reasoning. Justice Stevens' opinion, joined by Justice Breyer,
maintained that tribal courts have authority to adjudicate claims
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Justice Souter would not address the state's interest, but
would instead definitively expand Montana and decide that a
presumption against tribal authority over all nonmembers applies
157

Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365.

158 Id. at 366-67.
'

59

Id. at 367.
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regardless of land status.' 60 He read Strate to require this result
and maintained that it "fits with historical assumptions about tribal
authority and serves sound policy."'' 6 1 He further stated that a "rule
generally prohibiting tribal courts from exercising civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers" is practically sensible because conditioning
tribal jurisdiction on land ownership "would produce an unstable
jurisdictional crazy quilt."' 162 He maintained that the exchange of
land on reservations would make it "extraordinarily difficult" to
know when tribal jurisdiction applies.' 63 This is particularly
important, according to Justice Souter, because tribal courts "differ
from traditional American courts in a number of significant
respects."' 64 He also concluded that a presumption against tribal
court civil jurisdiction accords with one of Oliphant's major
concerns: "an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal
members be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty."' 165 Justice Souter found this particularly
important because the law applied by tribal courts includes tribal
codes, federal and state law, and traditional law, "which would be
unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out."'' 66 However, Justice
Souter did not explain why a defendant who hires a lawyer to make
his case in federal court, which the defendant may know very little
about, could not just as easily hire a lawyer familiar with tribal law
to make his case in tribal court. Finally, Justice Souter advocated a
general rule because there are currently no formal means for
removing tribal court cases to state or federal court. However real
this procedural barrier may be, surely it could be changed if tribes
were found to have broader jurisdiction.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court,
160 Hicks, 533
161Id. at

162

U.S. at 375-86 (Souter, J., concurring).

382.

Id. at 383.

163 id.
164/id.

165 Id. at
166Id.at

384 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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but her opinion disagreed with much of Justice Scalia's reasoning.
To Justice O'Connor, the case should have been resolved
according to the immunity of the state officials involved. Justice
O'Connor's critique of Justice Scalia's opinion advocated a more
careful approach to resolving issues of tribal sovereignty.
Essentially, it attacked the aspects of Justice Scalia's opinion that
most clearly disregarded the tribal interests at stake.
Justice O'Connor began by criticizing the Court's
"sweeping opinion" for undermining the tribal right of selfgovernance "without cause."' 167 She further maintained that the
168
Court's opinion "is not faithful to Montana and its progeny."'
Specifically, she asserted that the majority's casual limiting of the
first Montana exception to private consensual relationships was
unjustified, that more attention should have been given to the
ownership status of the land, and that the distinction between state
officers in their official and individual capacities deserved more
attention than the majority gave it.' 69 On the whole, Justice
O'Connor argued for an approach that allows Montana to "bring
coherence to our case law" through more careful consideration of
the issues involved, particularly land ownership status. 170 Justice
O'Connor's concerns, like those expressed by Justice Blackmun in
Strate, reveal the single-minded and relentless nature of the
Court's majority opinions-opinions that diminish tribal
sovereignty through broad language which produced a sweeping
and unwaivering expansion of divestiture principles that first
appeared only twenty-three years before Hicks.

167 Hicks, 533
168 Id. at 388.

U.S. at 387 (O'Connor, J. concurring).

Id. at 392, 395-96.
'0Id. at 395.
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CONCEPT

OF

SOVEREIGNTY:
PROTECTING CITIZENS FROM INDIANS
AND IGNORING THE CONCERNS OF TRIBES

The Supreme Court's Indian Law jurisprudence over the
last twenty-six years demonstrates a near-absolute disregard for the
power of tribes to effectively govern. If a case reaches the
Supreme Court, any nonmember potentially subject to tribal
jurisdiction needs only to say that he fears unfairness from the
tribe, and the tribe's jurisdiction will likely evaporate. The Court's
opinions embody a disrespect for tribes because they fashion broad
rules that assume bias in all tribal courts and fail to distinguish
between the many tribes. The Court advances a vision of Indians
as unfit to govern in the modem world. A number of scholars have
endeavored to explain the cases discussed in this article and
generally reach similar conclusions. This author finds that two
characteristics unify all of the cases discussed herein:
an
expression of concern for the "protection" of nonmembers from
tribal jurisdiction and an absolute disregard for the effect of the
holding on tribal governing powers. The motivation behind these
factors, however, remains considerably more obscured.
In the new Indian law, a new frontier of tribal divestiture,
protection of nonmembers always trumps the interests of the tribe.
The Court has repeatedly expressed tremendous concern that "[t]he
special nature of the [tribal] tribunals at issue makes a focus on7
consent and the protections of citizenship most appropriate.0 1
This quotation aptly expresses the Court's view that one of its
major functions in tribal sovereignty cases is the protection of
citizens from tribal governance. At the same time, the Court has
dismissed the tribal interest in effective government with little
discussion in case after case. It has found that prosecution of
17'Duro,

495 U.S. at 693; see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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reckless drivers on state roads running through the reservation,
jurisdiction over state officials alleged to have exceeded the scope
of their power on reservation land, and the power to prosecute
minor crimes on the reservation are all unnecessary for effective
self-government. The Court's majority did not give careful
attention to the tribal interest at stake in any of these cases.
What exactly "tribal sovereignty" means or should mean is
not necessarily clear, whether one looks to the Court's opinions or
to the legal literature discussing them. Essentially, "sovereignty"
represents the right of the tribes to govern themselves and develop
according to their own cultural norms and direction. At its
broadest, this means freedom from assimilationist pressure of
external governments, namely, the United States and the state in
which the reservation is located. A more narrow, yet still
protective view, potentially achievable under current law, is that
tribal sovereignty means the right to exercise jurisdiction and be
free from the control of external governments except where limits
to sovereignty are expressly authorized by Congress. The ability
of tribes to control their own land, govern their own economic
development, and govern the people on their territory, requires the
legal recognition of tribal sovereignty. The Supreme Court's cases
since Oliphant pose a direct threat to these powers. The tribes will
survive, as they have survived numerous destructive congressional
policies. However, the Court's active divestment contravenes
current congressional self-determination policy and the case law of
over one hundred-fifty years that refrained from imposing Courtcreated divestiture on the tribes.
The lack of a clear rationale or unifying theory among the
cases makes the Court's action particularly disturbing. Although
there are a variety of ways to understand the cases following
Oliphant and Montana, it is doubtful that the Court intentionally
established a new intellectual paradigm for deciding tribal
sovereignty cases. Instead, the Court has consistently expanded
the principle first announced in Oliphant without ever formally
acknowledging that it is in any way inconsistent with earlier
precedent. The Court has carried out a revolution in the law of
sovereignty at a time when many tribes are beginning to prosper
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for the first time since conquest. This may, in fact, be the impetus
for the Court's replacement of the previously broad recognition of
sovereignty principles with case-by-case divesture through broad
presumptions against sovereignty. The recent increase in many
tribes' political and financial ability to exercise rights and powers
associated with sovereignty creates a greater likelihood that tribal
sovereignty will impact non-tribal governmental entities and the
lives of nonmember individuals. This, as much as any intellectual
paradigm, may explain why the Supreme Court has reversed
traditionally protective principles.
The Court's failure to
acknowledge the change in the law of tribal sovereignty suggests
that either the Court has disingenuously attempted to strengthen its
holdings by distorting the meaning of precedent, or the Justices
truly believed that whatever earlier precedent says, it simply could
not have meant that non-Indians should be subject to tribal
jurisdiction.
Perhaps the best way to find the root of these disturbing
aspects of the Court's sovereignty cases is to explore the case that
established the basic principle of divestiture. Oliphant was a case
that two Justices maintained should have been decided such that
the tribes retained jurisdiction "as a necessary aspect of their
retained sovereignty.' ' 172 Scholars generally agree that precedent
suggested that result.173 What motivated the Court to announce a
broad rule of divestiture based on the "dependent status" of tribes?
Why was that principle, announced by Justice Marshall in the
1830s and unused for nearly one hundred-fifty years,
resurrected? 174 In Oliphant,itself, there are some clues.
The Court's concerns over due process and the protection
of individual liberty offers a partial explanation for the Court's
new approach to sovereignty. In Oliphant, the Court stated that
172Oliphant,435
173See,

U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
e.g., Frickey, supra note 10, at 34-35; see also Tweedy, supra note 50, at

151.
174 See Gould, supra note 49, at 843; see also Frickey, supra note 10, at 36.
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beginning with Justice Marshall's opinions, "the United States has
manifested [a] great solicitude that its citizens be protected by the
United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty."' 75
One of the best intellectual structures for
understanding the Court's use of this concern in Oliphant and
similar concerns in later cases is the "consent paradigm.' 76 Under
this view, Oliphant begins an era in which the court replaces
inherent sovereignty
with "a crabbed version of sovereignty based
177
upon consent."'
In Oliphant,however, a focus on consent suggests that "the
Court has apparently concluded that no racial majority would
consent to be ruled by a racial minority, especially where members
of the racial majority are excluded from jury service."'' 78 This
inference grows from the complete lack of discussion in Oliphant
of facts indicating consent, such as residence on the reservation
where signs announce tribal jurisdiction. If consent is the key, the
Court's lack of discussion on the point suggests a pre-judgment of
the matter. From that perspective, Oliphant and numerous
subsequent cases may involve "biased judgments about tribal
governments based upon racial stereotypes." 179 Some evidence
exists to support this view. For example, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion relies on the thinking of government during the allotment
period and comes remarkably close to expressly adopting the racist
presumptions of that time. For example, the Court quoted Ex parte
Crow Dog, 180 a decision from the era that began the allotment
policy. That case held that Indians were not subject to federal law
without congressional approval. In Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist
relied on Crow Dog for the proposition that non-Indians should not
be subject to tribal jurisdiction without prior congressional
approval. Justice Rehnquist's quotation from Crow Dog is littered
with ellipses in order to remove the plainly racist language
...
Oliphant,435 U.S. at 210.
176 See Gould, supra note 49.
77
1 Id. at 814.
178 Tweedy, supra note 50, at 153.
171Id. at 208.
10 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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embedded in the concepts that Oliphant relied upon. To illustrate,
Oliphant draws support from the notion that Indians were not
subject to U.S. law because, "'[i]t tries them, not by their peers,
nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by
...a different race, according to the law of a social state of which
1,81 The Court does not
they have an imperfect conception...
explain why this remains true where a non-Indian may hire a
More
lawyer familiar with tribal law to represent him.
the
plain
racism
disavow
not
expressly
does
the
Court
importantly,
of the original Crow Dog opinion, though it relies on the opinion's
reasoning. The complete passage in Crow Dog from which the
above Oliphant quotation is derived, reads in full:
It tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of
their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors
of a different race, according to the law of a social state
of which they have an imperfect conception, and which
is opposed to the traditions of their history, to the
habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their
savage nature; one which measures the red man's
82
revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.'
Thus, Oliphant not only revives the concept of "dependent status"
to divest tribes of sovereign power, but also finds support in
selectively chosen sources that embrace a racist conception of
Indians.
Another disturbing aspect of Oliphant that foreshadows
future cases is the Court's apparent indifference to the effect of its
decisions on reservations throughout the nation. The Court
acknowledged that its decision would affect roughly seventy-one
' Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11. This is an exact quotation of Oliphant,
including the ellipses.
i82
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added to highlight the portions omitted

in Oliphant).
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tribal court systems, some of which had already assumed
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 183 There was no discussion of
limiting its holding to heavily allotted reservations, such as the
Suquamish reservation, nor consideration of the impact on
reservations such as the "quintessential region of Indian
sovereignty, the Navajo Nation."' 84 The Court recognized the
crime problem on reservations that, as a practical matter, supported
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.' 85 Yet, the Court
placed the burden on Congress to address this problem that its
decision would create.' 86 As scholars have pointed out, without
tribal jurisdiction there was no effective sanction against minor
crimes because the state lacked jurisdiction, and the only
alternative was federal prosecution by U.S. attorneys, which was
unlikely. 187 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he loss of
territorial sovereignty meant that resident non-Indians could
violate tribal laws with impunity."' 88 The Court did not address
this concern, which grew directly from its decision to eliminate a
sovereign power that many tribes had assumed they possessed, in
any meaningful way.
Oliphant's primary importance derives from the fact that
the Court assumed unto itself the power to diminish tribal
sovereignty according to the "dependent status" of tribes. Oliphant
shows that U.S. policies of forced assimilation have not necessarily
ended. Instead, the cultural imperialism that dominated U.S.Indian relations for most of United States history shifted to a
different technique: judicial divestiture. If this was not clear in
Oliphant, the cases that relied on its basic principle have made it
clear.
Montana, which brought the Oliphant principle to bear on
civil powers of a tribe, also illustrates the Court's indifference to
the tribe's interest. Montana dismissed any interest the tribe might
Oliphant,435 U.S. at 196 n.7.
See Frickey, supra note 10, at 38.
s Oliphant,435 U.S. at 212.
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supra note 49, at 848.
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have had in regulating hunting and fishing by nonmembers on
nonmember fee land in one conclusory footnote, asserting that
"[a]ny argument that [such regulation] is necessary to Crow tribal
self-government is refuted by the findings of the District Court that
the State of Montana has traditionally exercised 'near exclusive'
jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on fee lands within the
reservation."' 89 This type of blatant disregard for tribal interests
when faced with the prospect of tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers suggests that the Court was not motivated by
precedent, nor driven entirely by sound legal analysis, but acted
from a more instinctual level, or perhaps an unspoken agenda, to
protect nonmembers from tribal jurisdiction in all significant
matters.
The Court progressively broadened its presumption against
tribal sovereign power in case after case that involved potentially
subjecting a nonmember to the jurisdiction of tribal government.
In Oliphant and Montana the Court was careful to state the limits
of its holding and address only the issue at hand. Montana even
laid out exceptions to the presumption that, on their face, would
allow a large degree of tribal sovereign power over nonmembers to
remain intact. This careful limiting of the holding faded over the
years, however, to the point that the presumption appears
conclusive. In Strate, for example, the Court broadly held that
adjudicative jurisdiction is no broader than legislative jurisdiction,
without providing even a minimum of explanation for this holding.
Then, in Hicks, the Court apparently abandoned all restraint when
it broadly asserted that the presumption against sovereignty applies
in all cases involving nonmembers and can only be overcome by a
private consensual relationship or a clear indication that such
power is essential for the exercise of tribal self-government. Even
these limited exceptions ring hollow in light of the increasing
scope of the cases examined here, which give the distinct
"89 450 U.S. at 564 n. 13; see also infra Section II.A. 1.
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impression that no authority over nonmembers will be deemed
essential for tribal self-government, except perhaps, where the tribe
has remained as "primitive" as the undeveloped land in Brendale.
By re-shaping the definition of tribal sovereignty, the Court
has struck at the heart of governmental independence for tribes at a
time when many tribal economies are at their strongest since
conquest. Thus, as the tribes became active players in the political
arena and increasingly able to assert jurisdictional powers, the
Court weakened their political bargaining position by undercutting
their jurisdictional authority.
To overcome the legal presumption against sovereignty
created by the Court, will require either a radical departure by the
Court itself or congressional action. A change in the Court's
approach is extremely unlikely, given that a pattern of increasing
divestiture has steadily developed. This development will also be
very difficult to reverse through Congress because, despite
congressional authority to do so, the political will is unlikely to
exist. Congress, it is true, remedied the lawless void created by
Duro.190 However, that circumstance of limited jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians is, politically, much different than asking
elected officials to withdraw power from their states or from the
federal government, and give that jurisdiction over voting, nonIndian U.S. citizens to the tribes.
Congress could restore sovereignty according to one of two
approaches. It could pass a law flatly delineating the extent of
tribal jurisdiction, not unlike the law passed to remedy the
jurisdictional void created by Duro. Or, it could pass legislation
that would provide a system whereby tribal governments and
courts receive either express recognition of their inherent sovereign
power, or delegated authority by demonstrating their ability to
administer such powers justly. Under such a system, certain
requirements could be imposed that, once satisfied, would allow
tribes to exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers in matters such as
the hunting and fishing regulation at issue in Montana, the zoning
power at issue in Brendale, and the civil adjudicatory power at
190 See infra section II.B.2.
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issue in Strate. Such a scheme would require a careful design if it
were to allow independent development by the tribes, rather than
tightly restricting them within the norms of the U.S. system.
Most likely, the Supreme Court is driven by the same
forces that make a congressional remedy unlikely: a fear that this
minority group will have legal power over members of the
majority U.S. culture.
Whether this derives from a legal
philosophy that cannot conceive of a strong third sovereign within
the United States' borders, or from a more instinctual, unspoken
fear of tribal power, is relevant, but probably only in the abstract
and in academia. Whatever its motives, the Court's decisions
continue the ugly American tradition of attacking tribal power,
independence, and even tribal culture.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Under U.S. law, Indian tribes traditionally retained a
version of territorial sovereignty that recognized their semiindependent governing authority. This view faced increasing tests
as tribes established more effective governments. The cases of
Williams and McClanahan held out hope that the Supreme Court
would recognize a strong version of tribal sovereignty. In the 1978
Oliphant decision, however, the Court began to destroy this hope
by reaching out to divest tribes of sovereign power on the basis of
their status as dependent nations. Since that time, the Court has
relentlessly expanded this principle. The cases following Oliphant
demonstrate the Court's overwhelming concern for nonmembers
subject to tribal jurisdiction and a fundamental disregard for tribal
interests.
To some extent, the facts of the initial cases can justify
these factors as a basis for the Court's decision, even if the broad
holding of the cases cannot be so easily supported. However, this
justification faded as the Court's holdings became even broader in
their impact and even less sympathetic to tribal concerns.
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One cannot escape the conclusion that, to a large degree,
Oliphant and subsequent sovereignty cases are result-driven, that
the Court fears the exercise of tribal sovereign powers now that
tribal financial and political situations make such exercise realistic.
A jurisprudential explanation may be that the Court views tribal
governments as an anomaly in the federal structure of governance.
Yet, the Court's own language in these cases suggests a naked fear
that tribal jurisdiction is, by its nature, a threat to individual liberty
and due process. This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the
Court decided sovereignty cases according to its desire to protect
nonmembers from tribal jurisdiction and without regard to the
tribe's interests or to the balance of these interests. It is an
approach that threatens virtually every aspect of the tribes' right to
self-government and sovereign power.

